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Background
The SLRC South Sudan programme has been working since 2012 to identify and 
understand the realities of livelihoods, access to basic services, and perceptions of 
governance in post-independence South Sudan. In 2013, SLRC conducted research 
in Uror, Nyirol, and Pibor counties to examine the dynamics of service delivery, state-
building and livelihood changes in the context of armed conflict and raiding. Following 
the outbreak of large-scale armed conflict in December 2013, the research was 
adjusted to reflect the shift in aid focus to humanitarian action.
This briefing paper summarises findings from the publications of SLRC South Sudan  
over the life of the programme, all of which can be found at: 
www.securelivelihoods.org/South-Sudan. 
Livelihoods under stress
Many of the attempts to support livelihood recovery and build resilience in South 
Sudan in the period following Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 
2005 were based on two implicit assumptions: first, that the end of the civil war and 
redirection of resources into state institutions would bring about a ‘peace dividend’ 
that would boost livelihoods; and second, that constrained livelihoods, or constrained 
access to livelihood resources – particularly dry-season grazing and access to water 
– had been and would continue to be a driver of conflict and insecurity. Many of the 
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Key messages 
 ■ Livelihoods were in a precarious state in South Sudan even 
before the outbreak of the current armed conflict in December 
2013. The assumption was that conflict had been the factor 
driving vulnerability, and that after the civil war recovery would 
take off. But this recovery largely did not occur, especially in 
Jonglei, where localized conflict continued.
 ■ Localized conflict was driven more by politics, control of livestock, 
and cycles of retribution than competition over land and water 
resources. The limited attempts to link livelihoods to peace-
building were based on an incomplete analysis.
 ■ Future livelihood reconstruction should be based on much 
more localised and deeper analysis of conflict, inter-communal 
grievances and inter-communal relations.
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policies and programmes pursued by aid actors incorporated 
these two assumptions. Both were, to some degree, mistaken.
Even before the resumption of widespread armed conflict 
in Greater Upper Nile in 2013, livelihoods were severely 
constrained, with only very limited recovery in the post-CPA 
period throughout much of South Sudan, but particularly in 
Jonglei and Upper Nile State. Despite reliance on a cattle-
based pastoral livelihood system, over half the households 
surveyed in Jonglei and Upper Nile in 2012 had no cattle, and 
40% had no livestock at all. Progress on animal health made 
during the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) period (1989-2005) 
had reversed, as community-based animal health worker 
networks collapsed from lack of sustained support and 
livestock diseases increased. Areas under cultivation were 
declining, yields were low, and livelihood support services were 
very limited. Qualitative research in 2013 that complemented 
the 2012 survey found crisis levels of livelihood insecurity, 
driven in part by serious violence and local conflict pre-dating 
the late 2013 outbreak of wider conflict. 
There had been a long history of livelihood support to civilian 
populations in areas under the control of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) throughout the OLS 
period. Following the CPA, there was a major effort to support 
the return and resettlement of refugees and those internally 
displaced. Although recovery was the watchword, SLRC 
research found that livelihoods in Jonglei appeared to be, in 
many cases, under greater stress in the period after South 
Sudan’s independence in 2011 than before. OLS initiatives 
ended after the CPA, as it was assumed by many aid agencies 
that the conflict had been the main impediment to livelihoods, 
though some observers pointed to evidence to the contrary.
Despite the status of livelihoods and food security, in many 
areas external actors’ major emphasis was not on livelihood 
recovery but instead on state-building and development at a 
very different level. Farming and livestock-keeping were facing 
severe constraints, yet few alternatives and little support 
were available. Nearly a quarter of the households surveyed 
in Jonglei and Upper Nile in 2012, particularly those displaced 
by localised violence and raiding, reported coping strategies 
based almost exclusively on natural resource extraction. 
Services provided by the state were very limited. Even 
international support for livelihood services at the local level 
was inadequate and in some cases actually declined in the 
post-CPA period. Very limited assistance (if any) was available 
to those who had lost cattle and other livestock. 
People relied heavily on kinship networks to maintain 
livelihoods during armed conflict and crisis. But when crisis 
affects large swaths of the community, these networks are 
overburdened and unable to be as supportive (among other 
problems). People in Jonglei fleeing violent conflict or raiding 
relied heavily on support, including shelter, from kin in non-
affected areas. This included Juba in the case of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) from Pibor County, or areas in Lakes 
State in the case of IDPs fleeing fighting in Bor and surrounding 
areas in early 2014. However, these host communities were 
also subject to the same kind of livelihood constraints (even if 
they had not been displaced), and IDPs who were forced to rely 
solely on kinship supports were among the most vulnerable 
groups noted in SLRC research. That said, in places such as 
Mingkaman, one of the largest settlements of IDPs in the 
country in 2014, both the IDPs and the host communities were 
benefitting from a major international relief effort, although 
as people from Jonglei moved cattle across the Nile to Lakes 
State, competition over grazing and water inevitably increased.
Livestock - IDP site in Mingkaman
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Understanding the context of livelihoods in armed 
conflict
In many areas – particularly but not exclusively Jonglei – armed 
conflict didn’t end despite the CPA and independence. Security 
remained the major constraint to livelihoods. Cattle-raiding was 
the primary reason given for the decline in livestock ownership. 
Raiding – and political rebellion framed as raiding, such as 
that of David Yau Yau’s forces – was rampant in 2012-2013, 
particularly in Jonglei but elsewhere too. This underlined the 
observation that, although labelled ‘post-conflict’, many parts 
of South Sudan – and Jonglei in particular – were still very much 
mired in armed conflict, albeit of a more localised nature than 
during the civil war. 
‘Traditional’ raiding has been transformed into an activity with 
additional commercial and political elements. Armed conflict 
was not ignored as a driver of livelihood vulnerability, but in 
many cases the links between livelihoods and conflict were 
misunderstood by external actors: in Jonglei, conflict was less 
directly about control over livelihood resources such as dry-
season grazing lands and access to water than it was about 
the ownership of cattle – and the links of cattle to many other 
aspects of culture, marriage, age sets1, and masculinity – but 
also about power and ethnic competition driven in many cases 
by cycles of revenge. In Jonglei, insecurity was the cause of poor 
livelihood outcomes, not the other way around, as is sometimes 
assumed. SLRC research noted that raiding between, for 
example, the Murle and the Lou Nuer in Jonglei took a different 
shape in each group, and had much to do with cultural 
narratives about one another, which were closely intertwined 
with perceptions of their own and other groups’ political power 
(or lack thereof) at the state and national levels. These social 
dynamics were frequently overlooked as drivers of conflict, 
though they almost certainly played into armed conflict at the 
local level, and to some degree even at the national level.
Raiding had become more violent in the post-CPA period; 
respondents explained that attacks were organised to also 
avenge losses of human life – including the alleged abduction 
of children by raiders on both sides – as well as property. Unlike 
earlier eras, livestock were sometimes killed rather than stolen 
during raids. Raiding had displaced many people – entire 
communities, in some cases – or forced other changes on 
seasonal migration and livelihood patterns, such as women 
and children moving to the cattle camp in hopes of improved 
security, where normally they would have remained behind 
to cultivate. However, armed conflict was not the only driver 
of livelihood vulnerability. Other hazards such as seasonal 
flooding, the rapid – and in many cases, spontaneous or 
unplanned – return of refugees and the internally displaced, 
and in more recent times, economic shocks have also put 
severe stress on livelihood systems in some communities, and 
thus exacerbated vulnerability and insecurity. Among the
1 Age sets are a key social category for some ethnic groups, creating a 
shared identity among people of similar age within the larger group.
displaced, exposure to further attack or other livelihood trauma 
increased.
Livelihoods were severely stressed, but it was political 
disagreements and power struggles, as well as unresolved 
leadership issues from the previous civil war era, that led to 
the re-emergence of widespread violence in 2013. Conflict 
dynamics shifted rapidly after 2013: the focus moved away 
from the rather localised raiding involving the Murle towards 
greater conflict between Dinka and Nuer groups, including many 
battles over control of Bor town. Hence, rather than simple 
causal factors or linear linkages, a complex web of factors link 
armed conflict, conflict drivers, and livelihoods. There is no clear 
linkage between the formal cessation of violent conflict and 
livelihoods recovery or improvement, and in many cases, no 
evident ‘peace dividend’.
Supporting livelihoods in conflict and ‘post-conflict’ 
situations
Post-CPA interventions by international actors were highly 
variable. In areas of heavy displacement there was a major – if 
short-lived – emphasis on return and resettlement. In other 
areas, particularly where displacement was more localised, 
the levels of support actually dropped in the post-CPA era. It 
is critical that donors and the South Sudanese government 
understand and take into account lessons from both the post-
CPA/independence period and the post-2013 conflict in future 
livelihood recovery and peace-building efforts. After widespread 
conflict broke out in South Sudan in December 2013, external 
support shifted towards humanitarian assistance; even in areas 
not affected by the armed conflict in 2014 and 2015, there was 
a distinct drawing back from engaging with the government 
in development programmes or service delivery. Livelihood 
support continued in some areas, and has been incorporated 
into the humanitarian response, but mostly only in specific 
geographic areas. International actors tended to withdraw from 
direct engagement with either the government or the armed 
opposition (SPLM-IO) in order to avoid the appearance of ‘taking 
sides’ or out of disdain for the reported actions of both parties.
As South Sudan’s crisis becomes even deeper and more 
prolonged, however, and more people are displaced over wider 
areas for longer periods of time, the livelihood options for 
South Sudanese households and kinship networks become 
ever more constrained. Many pastoralists have lost their 
cattle, and farmers are displaced and unable to cultivate. 
Government employees have not received pay in months or 
longer. Meanwhile, at the time of this writing, hyper-inflation 
is affecting the whole economy and the humanitarian aid 
effort is underfunded and declining. There are scattered 
reports of people leaving Juba to return to the countryside, 
having exhausted their urban options. Hundreds of thousands 
of people have crossed the borders into Uganda, Ethiopia 
and Sudan. People continue to rely on kinship networks, but 
under current circumstances, these are very hard pressed 
to compensate for the extreme pressures on livelihoods that 
people now face in South Sudan, and are unlikely to bounce 
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back quickly even if a peace agreement can be reached and 
more or less adhered to by leaders in Juba.
Conclusion and implications 
South Sudan emerged from the CPA and independence as 
a relatively wealthy country, with oil revenues and foreign 
aid contributing to public expenditures many times larger 
than those of its neighbours. Yet, in a country where the vast 
majority depend on rural livelihoods, only 4% of land was under 
cultivation and levels of livestock production were well below 
their potential. The wealth from oil did not necessarily translate 
into more stable livelihoods for many people, especially those 
living outside of Juba and other cities. The lack of roads and 
infrastructure throughout most of the country meant that 
opportunity remained out of reach for vast swathes of the 
population. In Jonglei and other remote areas of the country, 
the reach of the state and the engagement of external 
actors was limited. Even the provision of basic security was 
challenging and, in many areas, lacking.
More than five million people in South Sudan are currently 
in urgent need of humanitarian aid, with nearly one-and-
a-half million internally displaced, and now another million 
refugees. These figures entail large-scale loss of lives and 
extreme disruption to livelihoods, which will take decades or 
generations to recover from even if the ongoing civil war were 
to end tomorrow. What these alarming figures obscure is the 
dire situation that many people were in prior to the current 
armed conflict, due to livelihoods stress stemming from the 
previous civil war(s), ongoing political and inter-communal 
violence, seasonal natural hazards such as floods and 
droughts, livestock disease, lack of infrastructure, and the 
many other extreme challenges that South Sudan has faced 
from day one. Findings from the SLRC do not support the 
hypothesis that livelihoods can be expected to recover in a 
post-conflict environment—particularly in the absence of strong 
and sustained support. In some 
areas of South Sudan, support for 
livelihoods may have been better 
during armed conflict than 
afterward.
South Sudan will eventually 
emerge from the present 
crisis, but aid actors must not 
wait until then to turn their 
attention back to people’s 
livelihoods. Support for 
livelihoods and recovery 
is clearly important, both 
in conflict and in post-
conflict periods. But the 
links between conflict and 
livelihoods need to be better understood, led by more localised 
analysis. Working in circumstances of widespread conflict 
presents dilemmas for international aid actors, who were 
forced back into large-scale humanitarian action in 2014 at the 
apparent expense of longer-term programmes in non-conflict 
affected areas.  Experience from the OLS era indicates that it is 
possible to provide humanitarian assistance as well as support 
to livelihoods. Ensuring that support continues post-conflict (or 
in periods of low-grade conflict) should be a priority in South 
Sudan.
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